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CLD-116        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4170 
 ___________ 
 
 JUAN MUZA, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 ROBERT WERLINGER, Warden, F.C.I. Loretto 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00228) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 17, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
 
 (Opinion filed: March 1, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Juan Muza, a federal prisoner incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution 
in Loretto, Pennsylvania, appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his habeas 
petition.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d 
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Cir. IOP 10.6. 
I. 
Muza was convicted by a jury of various drug-related crimes in the Southern 
District of Alabama.  On September 8, 2000, he was sentenced to 292 months of 
imprisonment.  His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.  Thereafter, Muza 
filed a motion to vacate, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied by the 
sentencing court.  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit did not issue a certificate 
of appealability and later denied Muza’s application to file a second § 2255 motion.  
During the next several years, Muza filed several items in the sentencing court, including 
a petition for a writ of audita querela and an “Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3),” both of which the District Court denied as 
second or successive § 2255 motions.  Muza v. United States, Civ. No. 10-659, 2011 WL 
98522 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 10, 2011), adopting, 2010 WL 5572812 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 17, 2010); 
United States v. Muza, Crim. No. 99-74, 2009 WL 2905569 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 2009). 
His prior attempts at relief having been unsuccessful, Muza filed a habeas petition 
in the Western District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  In that petition, 
Muza asserted that his “continuing confinement” was “unlawful” because  (1) one of the 
officers who testified against him at trial, John Stuckey, was subsequently indicted for 
various federal crimes in connection with corrupt police practices; (2) the sentencing 
court determined the quantity of drugs involved in Muza’s crimes without forensic 
evidence; and (3) the sentencing court’s determination of drug quantity and application of 
certain sentencing enhancements violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  
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Muza also claimed to be actually innocent.   
The District Court summarily denied Muza’s petition, holding that Muza failed to 
establish that § 2255 was an ineffective or inadequate remedy such that relief under § 
2241 would be available to him.  It further concluded that the petition was barred by the 
abuse of the writ doctrine.  Muza timely appealed.1
II. 
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253(a).  
“We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a 
clearly erroneous standard to its factual findings.”  Manna v. Schultz, 591 F.3d 664, 665 
(3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). We may summarily affirm if no substantial question is 
presented by the appeal.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. IOP 10.6.    
 “Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which 
federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences that are allegedly in 
violation of the Constitution.”  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 
2002).   Accordingly, “unless a § 2255 motion would be ‘inadequate or ineffective,’ a 
habeas corpus petition under § 2241 [attacking a prisoner’s conviction or sentence] 
cannot be entertained by the court.”  Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 
538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).  That standard is met “only 
where the petitioner demonstrates that some limitation of scope or procedure would 
                                                 
1Muza filed a motion for a certificate of appealability in the District Court, which 
has been treated as a timely notice of appeal.  Federal prisoners seeking relief 
under § 2241 do not require a certificate of appealability to proceed with an 
appeal.  See United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en 
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prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording him a full hearing and adjudication of his 
wrongful detention claim,” and is not met simply because a § 2255 motion has been or 
would be unsuccessful.   Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538-39; see also In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 
245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997).   
Section 2255 clearly provides Muza with a sufficient and adequate means of 
pursuing his collateral attack on his convictions and sentence.  Furthermore, the facts 
underlying Muza’s claims were known to him at the time he was sentenced such that he 
could have pursued all of his claims in his initial § 2255 motion.2  Indeed, it appears that 
Muza raised the issue of Stuckey’s misconduct in his initial § 2255 motion and 
challenged the sentencing court’s determination of drug quantity on direct appeal.  See 
United States v. Muza, 232 F. App’x 934, 935 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We affirmed Muza’s 
convictions and sentence and found no clear error in the district court’s determination of 
drug quantity.”).  That Muza’s claims were previously unsuccessful does not entitle him 
to an opportunity to relitigate those claims through § 2241.  See Manna, 591 F.3d at 665 
(“A § 2255 motion is not ‘inadequate or ineffective’ merely because the sentencing court 
has denied relief or because the petitioner cannot meet the gatekeeping requirements of § 
2255.”) (citations omitted).   Muza’s allegations of actual innocence, which are based 
solely on the constitutional claims alleged in his petition, do not change that conclusion.3
                                                                                                                                                             
banc). 
  
2 Muza was sentenced on September 8, 2000, after the Supreme Court issued 
Apprendi.  Furthermore, Stuckey’s corrupt police practices were publicized in 
August 2000, and their potential impact on Muza’s sentence was raised before the 
sentencing court prior to sentencing.  
3 Muza’s case is distinguishable from In re Dorsainvil, in which we held that a 
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See id. (summarily affirming dismissal of § 2241 petition despite petitioner’s allegations 
of actual innocence).   
 Since Muza’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm. 
Given our conclusion that the District Court correctly held § 2241 to be unavailable to 
Muza, we need not address the abuse of the writ doctrine.
                                                                                                                                                             
prisoner “who claims that s/he is factually or legally innocent as a result of a 
previously unavailable statutory interpretation” could seek review under § 2241.  
119 F.3d at 248.  The petitioner in that case established exceptional circumstances, 
namely, he had been convicted for conduct subsequently deemed not to be 
criminal.  No such circumstances exist in Muza’s case. 
